Operating performance of the banking industry: an empirical investigation of the south eastern European region by Staikuras, Christos et al.
Abstract  
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(SEE) banking industry over the period 1998-2003. To this end, we investigate the 
empirical relationship between operating expenses and bank, market and country 
speciﬁc characteristics. Operating performance is found to be positively related to
loan quality and the asset size or the bank’s market share, and negatively related 
to liquidity, the loan ratio and bank’s age.
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1.  Introduction
The operating performance of ﬁnancial institutions has long been at the center of aca-
demic research and has received a substantial amount of attention. This is primarily 
due to the fact that operating efﬁciency is of particular interest for both managers,
whose aim is to improve the performance of their ﬁnancial ﬁrms, and policy makers,
whose task is to assess the effects of market structure on performance and, therefore, 
to safeguard the stability of the ﬁnancial system (Berger and Mester, 1997). The ma-
jority of the literature concerning bank operating performance has focused on the US 
banking market (Berger and Humphrey, 1997), and to a lesser extent on the European 
banking sector (see, for example, Altunbas et al., 2001), while, as far as we are aware, 
relatively little research has been carried out to investigate the issue of operating per-
formance in the South Eastern European (SEE) banking region.
 Banks play a dominant role in the ﬁnancial system and economy of the SEE re-
gion, as capital markets are practically limited to the equity markets and are, in gen-
eral, quite fragile and underdeveloped. Indeed, in 2003, domestic credit to the private 
sector was 48.5 per cent of GDP in Croatia, and 25.8 per cent in Bulgaria, while 
the market value of all shares listed on the stock market was 19.2 per cent and 7.9 
per cent respectively (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], 
2004). A similar picture emerges for the rest of the SEE countries, Romania being the 
only exception.1 As a result, it appears from a ﬁrst glimpse that banks constitute the
backbone of ﬁnancial markets in the SEE region.
 However, despite the dominance of the banking sector, the degree of ﬁnancial
penetration through banking products and services has been lagging behind that of 
other emerging markets and the European Union (EU), owing to, among other fac-
tors, unsound economic policies and structural market inefﬁciencies, mainly in the
previous decade. These factors, in many instances, have resulted in severe ﬁnancial
crises. In particular, the occurrence of banking crises during the nineties coincided 
with the transition period and was common in most SEE countries.2 These were trig-
gered by the bad debts inherited from the past regimes and the inability of ﬁnancial
institutions and other market players to assimilate the rules of a free market economy 
(European Commission, 2004).
1. The domestic credit to the private sector and the market value of all shares listed on the stock 
market in Romania were roughly the same, at about 9.5 per cent in 2003, though the low domestic 
credit to the private sector signiﬁes the slow pace of development of banking activities rather
than the advance of the ﬁnancial market in general.
2. Indicatively, we can mention the strong economic shock that hit the FYR of Macedonia economy 
in the ﬁrst half of 1999, the hostilities in Serbia & Montenegro during the previous decade, the
collapse of the pyramid scheme in Albania in 1997, the crisis in Romania in 1997-98, and the 
severe economic crisis in Bulgaria in 1996-97 (one of the world’s worst banking crises in recent 
history, when 14 out of the 35 registered commercial banks failed).
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 The low level of maturity of the ﬁnancial system also played a detrimental role.
In particular, all SEE countries started with low levels of intermediation, given the 
absence of the framework characterizing market-based economies, the over-cautious 
behavior of banks, the lack of a sufﬁcient number of clients having the appropri-
ate risk-return proﬁle, and the weak legal framework for creditor protection. As a
result, loans to the private sector, on average, stood at about one-eighth of the credit 
provided by the European Union banking system, where the domestic credit to GDP 
ratio reached 120 per cent in 2003 (European Central Bank [ECB], 2004).
 However, since 2000 a dramatic change has been observed, as economic stability 
and the adoption of a number of ambitious economic reform programs have started 
to pay off. Indeed, the transformation of the banking sector in the region has gained 
momentum as the ‘opening up’ of SEE countries’ ﬁnancial markets enhanced bank-
ing intermediation.3 This was the result of the implementation of a common reform 
process, including the restructuring, rehabilitation, and privatization of state-owned 
banks, the liquidation of insolvent institutions, and the improvement of the adminis-
trative efﬁciency and capability of the banking sector.
 Moreover, the privatization of the banking sector in the region was enhanced and 
foreign penetration gradually increased, although at unequal pace among the SEE 
countries. The asset share of state-owned banks has been reduced signiﬁcantly in
all countries, falling to levels below 5 per cent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, and FYR of Macedonia, indicating that the privatization process has been 
quite effective (EBRD, 2004). In turn, foreign ownership has been proving beneﬁcial,
as it entails a transfer of ﬁnancial know-how, human capital, sophisticated IT appli-
cations, investment resources, and more advanced risk management systems, which 
could improve banking operating performance and enhance ﬁnancial intermediation.
Recently, a growing number of studies have focused on the effects of foreign pen-
etration on the efﬁciency of the banking sector of emerging economies. Studies, such
as those of Weill (2003), Bonin et al. (2005), and Fries and Taci (2005), argue that 
foreign-owned banks are more cost-efﬁcient than locally-owned ones. In addition, 
Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) and Kraft et al. (2002) suggest that new banks in general, 
and new foreign banks in particular, are the most cost efﬁcient ﬁnancial institutions
in Croatia. Jemrie and Vujeie (2002) undertook a similar analysis, also for Croatia, 
yielding similar results.
 In addition, the establishment and adoption of new prudential regulation and 
tighter supervision rules, and the improvement of accounting and disclosure stand-
ards have also beneﬁted banking intermediation.4 Since 1998 signiﬁcant efforts have
3. However, the credit expansion has so far primarily been directed towards households and to a 
lesser extent towards the corporate sector (European Commission, 2004).
4. Studies on transition countries have stressed that banking sector reform is a necessary condition 
for the development and deepening of the sector, while it is also essential to maintain and im-
prove ﬁnancial stability (European Commission, 2004).
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been directed towards improving the legislation related to the banking sector, while 
there have been continuous amendments of the banking supervision regulatory sys-
tem aiming at its harmonisation with the EU regulatory regime and the international 
standards of effective supervision. These laws have increased the attractiveness of 
the banking industry to foreign investments, strengthened prudential standards and 
practices in the banks’ operations, enhanced corporate governance, and improved ef-
ﬁciency in banking operations and supervision (Mamatzakis et al., 2005).
 Indeed, the EBRD index on banking sector reform shows that all SEE countries 
are classiﬁed, on average, around 3.0 in 2003, most of them coming up from much
lower levels in 1998 (Table 1). This rating apparently implies that bank solvency and 
the framework for prudential supervision and regulation have been improving over 
the years, with the new legislation being a dominant contributor. Efforts are now 
shifting towards the risks that banks are exposed to and ways to enhance the pruden-
tial assessment of risks, both within banks and in terms of supervision of the banking 
sector.5
Table 1. EBRD Index on Banking Sector Reform
 Note: The EBRD index on banking sector reform provides a ranking of progress for liberaliza-
tion and institutional reform of the banking sector, on a scale of 1 to 4+. A score of 1 represents 
little change from a socialist banking system apart from the separation of the central bank and com-
mercial banks, while a score of 4+ represents a level of reform that approximates to the institutional 
standards and norms of an industrialized market economy.
Country 1998 2003
Albania 2.0 2.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2.3 2.3
Bulgaria 2.7 3.3
Croatia 2.7 3.7
FYR of Macedonia 2.7 2.7
Romania 2.3 2.7
Serbia & Montenegro 1.0 2.3
5. In the context of strengthening banking sectors and against the background of previous low trust 
in the banking sector, the implementation of deposit insurance schemes has been advancing in 
the region, with full or almost complete implementation in most systems. Deposit insurance can 
play an important stabilizing role, as it improves conﬁdence and thereby decreases the risks of
dramatic changes in funding.
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 In addition, promising macroeconomic developments, such as the ongoing efforts 
towards ﬁscal consolidation, the gradual reduction of interest rates and the accompa-
nying lower risk premiums, the gradual stabilization of exchange rates, the increase 
of expected lifetime income in the region, and the expansion of demand for money 
have all positively contributed to the development of ﬁnancial markets (European
Commission, 2004).
 The above mentioned developments have made the investigation of operating per-
formance in the SEE banking sectors a more relevant issue now than in earlier times. 
This paper follows a general-to-speciﬁc model approach to examine the main deter-
minants of banks’ operating performance, across countries and over time, in the SEE 
region (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Ro-
mania and Serbia & Montenegro6) over the period 1998-2003. Moreover, we break 
down operating performance into its components (personnel expenses and admini-
strative expenses), and estimate their interaction with various market and economic 
characteristics (see also Kwan, 2003). 
 Thus, the purpose of this paper is threefold; ﬁrst, to provide evidence of the deter-
minants of operating performance in the banking sector of the SEE region; second, 
to deal with the underlying aggregation bias by shedding some light on the principal 
components of operating performance; and third, to exploit data for the SEE region, 
recently made available, corresponding to an era characterized by substantial struc-
tural reform processes during the examined time period.
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in 
the analysis. Section 3 analyzes the empirical model and presents the results, while 
conclusions are drawn in Section 4.  
2. Data Description
Bank level data for seven SEE countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia & Montenegro) are obtained from 
the Bankscope database and cover the period 1998-2003. The annual balance sheet 
and income statement ﬁgures are comparable across countries and therefore suitable
for a panel data study.7 Our dataset includes 76 banks in 1998, 98 in 1999, 112 in 
6. Serbia & Montenegro was the new name adopted by the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
on February 4, 2003. We opted to refer to this country by the name “Serbia & Montenegro” for 
the entire 1998-2003 period for convenience purposes. Please also note that Serbia & Mon-
tenegro has since ceased to exist as a single country, by virtue of the result of the Montenegrin 
independence referendum of May 21, 2006, and has broken up into its constituent parts, namely 
i. the Republic of Serbia and ii. Montenegro.
7. The data are examined for reporting errors and other inconsistencies. Also, it should be noted 
that all countries being analyzed are subject to the same survival bias, so the comparisons across 
countries are valid.
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2000, 126 in 2001, 154 in 2002, and 152 in 2003, comprising a large portion of banks 
both in terms of the number of ﬁnancial institutions operating in the SEE region, but
mainly in terms of importance, based on the balance sheet aggregates. 
 Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics over the examined period. It becomes 
apparent that the average bank size in Croatia is the largest among the SEE countries, 
while the smallest average size is in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Overall, the SEE region is 
characterized as an emerging banking regime, and thus it is dominated by relatively 
small ﬁnancial institutions.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (1998-2003)
 Note: TA: Total Assets; L/A: Loans / Total Assets; LLR/L: Loan Loss Reserves / Gross Loans; 
E/A: Equity / Total Assets; OE/A: Operating Expenses / Total Assets. Figures are means (presented 
in thousands of € for TA and percentages for all other variables) for SEE countries over the period 
1998-2003. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Further descriptive statistics can be 
provided upon request.
This point is further enhanced by the ratio of loans to total assets, which stands at an 
average of 42.5 per cent over the period 1998-2003, lower than the average Euro-
pean ratio (50 per cent over the same time period), with only two countries, namely 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presenting higher than the average ratio. The slug-
gish credit growth observed in the previous decade can be attributed to inadequate 
Country TA L/A LLR/L E/A OE/A
Albania 322,845 21.399 13.791 10.512 2.697
(466,066) (17.339) (21.729) (7.320) (1.328)
Bosnia-Herzegovina 90,760 47.739 10.603 23.230 6.748
(107,665) (14.634) (10.331) (16.145) (2.977)
Bulgaria 239,211 39.898 8.781 18.670 5.867
(310,994) (15.783) (9.756) (13.010) (2.514)
Croatia 614,094 52.883 11.307 16.842 4.646
(996,930) (11.136) (8.176) (10.648) (2.376)
FYR of Macedonia 102,088 39.525 13.385 29.606 6.245
(149,754) (18.700) (8.557) (13.485) (4.687)
Romania 491,599 36.526 5.250 21.305 8.369
(959,103) (18.597) (8.676) (11.628) (5.296)
Serbia & Montenegro 168,140 37.696 13.675 22.823 6.757
(180,308) (18.636) (11.803) (16.433) (4.948)
SEE 329,007 42.538 10.193 20.431 6.129
 (787,341) (17.612) (10.442) (13.698) (3.927)
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legal protection for lenders, lack of credit history for most companies, scarcity of 
adequate risk management techniques, lack of adequate collateral, as well as stricter 
bank regulation and supervision (ECB, 2004). To these factors one must add the gen-
eral economic uncertainty, the poor performance of the enterprise sector, and the high 
real lending rates. However, it seems that, recently, credit growth has been recover-
ing substantially, as economic conditions start improving. Thus, the ratio of loans to 
total assets stands just above 50 per cent in 2003 compared to 40 per cent in 1998.8 
Bank credit to households, including consumer credit and mortgage loans, played the 
most important role in the growth of domestic credit to the private sector across the 
region. The average loan ratio is the highest in Croatia (53 per cent), and the lowest in 
Albania (21 per cent). In the case of Albania, banks continue to invest in risk-free or 
low-risk investments, mainly treasury bills and accounts to non-resident banks. The 
most signiﬁcant increase in loans and advances to customers within the structure of
assets was recently observed in Serbia & Montenegro; the size of this asset category 
increased from 32 per cent of total assets in 2001 to 56 per cent in 2003.
 Regarding the quality of credit expansion, the average ratio of loan loss reserves 
to gross loans exceeds 10 per cent. The highest is observed in Albania, while Roma-
nia stands at the other end of the spectrum. The poor quality of credit portfolio was 
inherited from the old regime, where credit risk evaluation was negligible, and the 
credit policy was used as an instrument by the government to suit the needs of the 
centrally planned economy (Stubos and Tsikripis, 2004). In recent years, an improve-
ment has been observed, as the loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio fell from 11.9 
per cent in 1998 to 7.5 per cent in 2003. However, the share of non-performing loans 
to the total loan portfolio is still higher than the European average.
 The average ratio of equity to total assets, though varying signiﬁcantly across
countries, stands at around 20 per cent, almost double the average European ratio. 
The reasons behind this low ﬁnancial leverage in the region are the ongoing restruc-
turing process of state-owned ﬁnancial institutions, the relatively low credit expan-
sion, and banks’ compensation for poor access to other sources of funds. This average 
ratio is the lowest in Albania, slightly exceeding 10 per cent, whereas the highest is 
registered in the FYR of Macedonia, standing at around 30 per cent. Indeed, the rela-
tively high capital adequacy ratio implies that banks have signiﬁcant room for credit
expansion without impairing capital positions. 
8. These descriptive statistics on a year to year basis for the SEE countries can be provided by the 
authors upon request.
9. Administrative expenses include various types of bank expenses associated with bank opera-
tions, such as the adoption of new information technology, depreciation, legal fees, marketing 
expenses, and non-recurring costs related to bank restructuring.
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 Table 2 also presents the ratio of operating expenses to total assets. Operating 
expenses consist of personnel expenses, i.e. salaries and other employee beneﬁts,
including transfers to pension reserves, and administrative expenses.9 The underlying 
doctrine in the literature of operating expenses argues that the lower these costs are 
as a percentage of assets, the more efﬁcient a ﬁnancial institution is. On average, this
ratio stood at 6.1 per cent in the SEE region over the period 1998-2003, much higher 
than that observed in the EU (ECB, 2004). Romania presents the highest ratio (8.4 
per cent), while Albania shows the lowest (2.7 per cent). However, it appears that this 
ratio declines over time in all SEE countries, except for the FYR of Macedonia and 
Serbia & Montenegro, where it increases slightly from 7.2 and 6.4 per cent respec-
tively in 1998 to 7.5 and 6.6 per cent respectively in 2003, owing mainly to the open-
ing of new branches and an increase in the number of bank employees. Generally, an 
improvement in banking operation in the SEE region has taken place as the ratio of 
operating expenses to total assets clearly exhibits a downward trend over the period 
1998-2003. 
3. Empirical Analysis
The current study follows Kwan (2003) who relied on accounting measures to com-
pare the operating performance of credit institutions operating in seven Asian coun-
tries, after controlling for bank-speciﬁc characteristics and the output mix of ﬁrms.
As the author argues, accounting ratios are highly correlated with efﬁciency (see also
Berger and Mester, 1997; Peristiani, 1997). Moreover, one should be aware that a 
comparison, in terms of operating performance, across heterogeneous credit institu-
tions is meaningful subject to the assumption that banks have equal access to the 
same production technology.10
 This paper seeks primarily to examine the relationship between operating ex-
penses and various bank and market characteristics, but also investigates whether the 
former vary systematically across SEE countries and over time, using information 
derived from the principal components of operating expenses. To this end, the fol-
lowing regression model is estimated:
10. This explains why cross-study comparisons often reveal substantial differences even for the 
same countries or bank categories, pointing out a key weakness in measuring performance 
(Berger and Mester, 1997).
(1)
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where i denotes the credit institution and t the examined time period, while ε captures 
the disturbance term.
 The dependent variable is measured as total operating expenses divided by total 
assets to form a per unit cost measure (OE). An alternative deﬁnition relates efﬁ-
ciency to internal productivity measures, such as bank output to the number of em-
ployees. Although this deﬁnition could be accurate, it is not appropriate for cross-
country comparisons, since this index would not necessarily be comparable for banks 
across borders. In addition, indicators of population per employee or branch might be 
somewhat misleading as measures of quality and banking efﬁciency. There might, for
example, have been a tendency to close branches and thus cut the number of branch 
employees, while at the same time the number of central administration or back of-
ﬁce employees may not have been cut and, in some cases, their number may have
actually increased. Also, staff ﬁgures may vary according to labor mobility, contract 
ﬂexibility, and employee qualiﬁcations; overstafﬁng and inefﬁciency may be either
alleviated or compounded by the structural composition of bank employees (Davis 
and Salo, 1998). 
 On the side of the explanatory variables, seven bank-speciﬁc variables are in-
cluded. These are the ratio of loans to total assets (L/A), the ratio of loan loss reserves 
to gross loans (LLR/L), the ratio of cash and due from banks to total assets (C/A), 
the ratio of equity to total assets (E/A), the ratio of bank deposits to customer and 
short-term funding (D/F), a variable capturing bank’s age (AGE), and total assets to 
count for size effects (TA) (or alternatively a bank’s market share to capture market 
power). 
 The loan loss reserves ratio is used as a proxy for the loan portfolio quality. A 
number of hypotheses link the amount of problem loans and operating performance 
in the banking industry. According to Berger and DeYoung (1997) the ‘bad manage-
ment’ hypothesis assumes that loan quality is endogenous in the quality of bank man-
agement, indicating that managers who are poor at dealing with day-to-day opera-
tions are also poor at managing the bank’s loan portfolio. Under this hypothesis, we 
expect a positive coefﬁcient, since an inefﬁcient bank with high operating expenses
would also have a higher ratio of problem loans. The positive relationship between 
problem loans and operating expenses can also be explained by the ‘bad luck’ hy-
pothesis, implying that an exogenous increase in non-performing loans may force 
even the most cost efﬁcient banks to purchase additional inputs necessary to adminis-
ter these problematic credits, Berger and DeYoung, (1997). On the other hand, under 
the ‘skimping’ hypothesis there is a trade-off between short-term operating expenses 
and future loan performance problems, as banks that devote fewer resources to credit 
underwriting and loan monitoring may appear to be more cost efﬁcient in the short-
run (Berger and DeYoung (1997)), because fewer operating expenses can support the 
same quantity of loans and other outputs. Under this hypothesis, we expect a negative 
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coefﬁcient for the loan loss reserve ratio, since banks which spend more resources on
loan screening would have fewer problem loans at the expense of higher operating 
expenses (Mester, 1996).
 The ratio of cash and due from banks to total assets controls for bank liquidity. 
The higher the ratio is, as the nominator constitutes the ﬁrst line of defence in case of
liquidity problems, the larger the stored liquidity of the ﬁnancial institution. Howev-
er, liquid assets could also raise operating expenses as these assets require additional 
transportation, storage, protection, and labor costs. Thus, the cash ratio is expected to 
have a positive coefﬁcient.
 The ratio of equity to total assets captures the bank’s risk preferences and the bank 
management quality. This ratio reﬂects the degree to which shareholders have their
own capital at risk, and hence may reﬂect their incentives to monitor management
and assure that the institution operates efﬁciently. Under the ‘moral hazard’ hypoth-
esis, the higher this ratio is, the more efﬁcient the institution is likely to be (Eisenbeis
et al., 1999). Thus, given that a high degree of capitalization is a clear indication 
of risk aversion in the operation of the banks in favor of quality management, a 
high equity ratio beneﬁts the operating performance of the credit institutions. Thus, a
negative coefﬁcient is expected for the equity ratio. However, apart from the risk, a
bank’s capital level directly affects operating expenses by providing an alternative to 
deposits as a funding source for loans. Since raising equity typically involves higher 
expenses than raising deposits, the coefﬁcient of the equity ratio is expected, in this
case, to be positive. Overall, the sign of the coefﬁcient of the equity ratio is ambigu-
ous.
 The ratios of loans to total assets and bank deposits to customer and short-term 
funding are included to control for the output and funding mix of each ﬁnancial in-
stitution. As far as the ratio of loans to assets is concerned, since operating expenses 
related to originating, maintaining and monitoring loans might be much higher than 
those needed for trading and available for sale securities, banks with a greater propor-
tion of loans in their balance sheet are expected to present higher costs. Also, the co-
efﬁcient of the ratio of bank deposits to customer and short term funding is expected
to take negative values, as, in general, those funding sources are less costly than retail 
deposits.  
 A bank’s age might also be related to performance, since bank production pro-
cedure might follow the ‘learning by doing’ hypothesis (Mester, 1996). This would 
imply that the coefﬁcient variable is negative. On the other hand, at some stage, ef-
ﬁcient management might become less prominent and opt, instead, for a less proac-
tive style, leading to a decrease in efﬁciency (Esho, 2001). If, indeed, the latter effect
dominates, the age variable should display a positive coefﬁcient.
 Moreover, in terms of market characteristics, we include the EBRD index of 
banking sector reform (EBRD) to account for differences in the ﬁnancial environment
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where credit institutions operate. To this end, we also incorporate the Herﬁndahl in-
dex (HHI) (or alternatively the 3-ﬁrm concentration ratio) to capture the degree of
concentration in the SEE banking markets, the asset share of state-owned banks (SB) 
and the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (CPS). 
 Apart from the aforementioned bank and market speciﬁc characteristics, we also
include two variables that reﬂect the general macroeconomic conditions existing
in each SEE country; these are the inﬂation rate (INFL) and the GDP per capita 
(GDP). GDP measures the level of productivity in the economy; in particular, rising 
productivity would raise the demand for bank products. The increased demand for 
bank products would bring some additional expenses in evaluating and maintaining 
the additional amount of loans.11 Also, inﬂation would negatively affect operational
performance as inﬂationary periods would exert pressures on the demand for bank
products.  
 After controlling for bank, market and macro speciﬁc variables, country speciﬁc
dummy variables (D) are introduced to identify potential differences in operating 
performance across countries. These dummies are expected to capture differences 
in the labor productivity in particular, but also input inefﬁciencies in general (Kwan,
2003).12 Finally, we use a time trend (T) to capture any systematic change in operat-
ing expenses over time. The privatization of credit institutions in the SEE countries, 
the entry of foreign banks, as well as the adoption of new prudential regulation and 
tighter supervision rules are expected to lead to lower production costs over time. 
 Table 3 provides information on the degree of correlation between the variables 
used in the model. The bank-speciﬁc variables are not signiﬁcantly correlated with
the market or macro determinants, though there seems to be a strong correlation 
between the credit to the private sector and the GDP per capita and the EBRD index 
(positive), as well as between the credit to the private sector and the variable captur-
ing the asset share of state-owned banks (negative).
11. We are thankful to the anonymous referee who stressed the importance of these control vari-
ables.
12. For identiﬁcation purpose, the dummy variable for Croatia is excluded so that the estimated
coefﬁcients measure the production operating performance of the remaining SEE countries
relative to Croatia.
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix
 Note: L/A: Loans / Total Assets; LLR/L: Loan Loss Reserves / Gross Loans; C/A: Cash / Total 
Assets; E/A: Equity / Total Assets; D/F: Bank Deposits /  Customer and Short Term Funding; AGE: 
Bank’s Age; TA: Total Assets; EBRD: EBRD index on banking sector reform; HHI: Herﬁndahl
Index; SB: share of state-owned banks; CPS: credit to the private sector; INFL: inﬂation rate; GDP:
GDP per capita.
3.1. Operating expenses
Table 4 presents the regression results of Equation (1) with operating expenses as the 
dependent variable. The models are estimated using the ordinary least square (OLS) 
approach within a panel, where robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedastic-
ity are calculated.13 The models ﬁt the data reasonably well, with R-square ranging 
from 52 per cent to 58 per cent. Moreover, the results are very robust to all alternative 
speciﬁcations, while almost all variables retain their sign and level of signiﬁcance
across different speciﬁcation models.
  
L/A LLR/L C/A E/A D/F AGE TA EBRD HHI SB CPS INFL GDP
L/A 1.00
LLR/L -0.04 1.00
C/A -0.03 0.01 1.00
E/A 0.15 0.05 0.13 1.00
D/F 0.17 -0.12 -0.01 0.14 1.00
AGE 0.07 0.24 0.01 -0.17 -0.29 1.00
TA -0.08 0.01 -0.19 -0.62 -0.17 0.41 1.00
EBRD 0.24 -0.08 -0.22 -0.08 -0.04 0.11 0.14 1.00
HHI -0.30 0.00 -0.22 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.08 1.00
SB -0.27 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.12 -0.20 0.02 -0.49 0.12 1.00
CPS 0.43 0.13 -0.18 -0.08 -0.09 0.30 0.13 0.63 -0.31 -0.60 1.00
INFL -0.08 -0.19 -0.04 0.06 0.12 -0.07 0.06 -0.33 -0.07 0.39 -0.12 1.00
GDP 0.31 0.02 -0.26 -0.13 -0.12 0.27 0.22 0.59 0.00 -0.43 0.83 -0.05 1.00
13. We follow White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator, which pro-
vides correct estimates of the coefﬁcient covariances in the presence of heteroscedasticity of
unknown form. The White covariance matrix is given by the form:
 The estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix allows inferences based on the results of the 
least squares without actually specifying the type of heteroscedasticity.
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 The coefﬁcient of the loans to total assets ratio is positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant, indicating that the operating expenses associated with credit origination and
loan monitoring are quite substantial. The coefﬁcient of the loan loss reserves ratio is
always positive and statistically signiﬁcant, consistent with the ‘bad management’ or
the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis. This observation is consistent with the vast majority of the 
literature (see, for example, Altunbas et al., 2000). The liquidity ratio is also positive 
and statistically signiﬁcant across all models, suggesting that although liquid assets
reduce a bank’s liquidity risk, these assets involve additional operating expenses (see 
also Altunbas et al., 2000 and Kwan, 2003).
 The coefﬁcient of the equity to assets ratio, though always positive, is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, which indicates that raising equity involves
higher operating expenses than raising deposits. This ﬁnding may arise from the
high capital ratios observed in the SEE banking systems, largely as the result of the 
restructuring plans implemented by the governments in these countries to manage 
insolvency problems. This process of restructuring comes at a cost in terms of operat-
ing performance, a typical characteristic for emerging ﬁnancial markets. We expect
the efﬁciency loss due to the restructuring process to fall, as markets mature.
 The deposit mix variable presents the expected negative sign and is statistically 
signiﬁcant. An interesting ﬁnding is that the coefﬁcient of the age variable is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, in contrast to the ‘learning by doing’
hypothesis, as identiﬁed by Mester (1996), DeYoung and Hasan (1998), and Kraft
and Tirtiroglu (1998). This ﬁnding may be attributed to a striking characteristic of
the SEE banking systems; ‘older’ banks in this region are mostly newly privatized 
state-owned credit institutions that have inherited signiﬁcant cost inefﬁciencies from
the old regime, where market oriented practices were not present and cost efﬁciency
had not been a priority issue for government authorities. 
 Moreover, the size variable is reported with a negative sign and is statistically 
signiﬁcant in all models, which is not surprising given the small size of ﬁnancial
institutions that dominate the SEE banking regime. This ﬁnding suggests that banks
could gain substantial beneﬁts by exploiting further economies of scale in order to
improve their operational performance (see also Allen and Rai, 1996). In addition, 
when bank’s market share (in terms of total assets) is used, its coefﬁcient is also nega-
tive and statistically signiﬁcant (see Model 3).
 Regarding the market and macro determinants, these are all statistically insi-
gniﬁcant,14 the only exception being the EBRD index on banking sector reform, 
which is positive (see Model 5). The positive coefﬁcient of this variable could signal
14. We run several alternative speciﬁcations (not presented in the paper) and the signiﬁcance of
the market and macro variables does not change. Results can be provided upon request by the 
authors.
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that the liberalization and institutional reform of the banking sector is a long and in-
tensive process that involves additional operating expenses for credit institutions, at 
least in the short run, before this process is fully completed. Any beneﬁts from that
reform are expected in the medium or long term. The Herﬁndahl index is also statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level of signiﬁcance, albeit only in one speciﬁca-
tion (see Model 4), but is, surprisingly, negative. This result supports the ﬁnding of
a negatively signed size (and market share) variable, arguing that exploiting further 
economies of scale could improve operating performance.
 Surprisingly, although one would expect that the GDP per capita would assert a 
positive effect on banks’ operating expenses, in the current study its coefﬁcient is
statistically insigniﬁcant. A possible interpretation could be based on the lagging level
of ﬁnancial integration in these countries compared to their EU counterparts; the latter
implies that the possible demand effects that are observed in the EU banking systems, 
stemming from higher GDP per capita, are limited in the transition economies. Also, 
by the same token, the inﬂation variable is found to be statistically insigniﬁcant too.
 As far as the country dummies are concerned, Romania has a positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant coefﬁcient in all speciﬁcations, indicating that per unit operating ex-
penses in that country are higher than in Croatia. Similarly, the coefﬁcient of Bulgaria
is mostly positive and statistically signiﬁcant, while Serbia & Montenegro presents
a positive coefﬁcient in all speciﬁcations, though that coefﬁcient is not always sig-
niﬁcant. On the other hand, no consistent picture emerges for Albania, Bosnia-Herze-
govina and the FYR of Macedonia, since their coefﬁcients change sign and level of
signiﬁcance according to the speciﬁcation. Overall, our results indicate that there are
substantial differences in the cost structure of banks across SEE countries over the 
examined period. The coefﬁcient of the time trend is negative and statistically signiﬁ-
cant in most cases, indicating that, on average, operating expenses among the SEE 
countries followed a downward path from 1998 to 2003; the latter veriﬁes the efforts
undertaken to direct the banking sector towards a more efﬁcient structure.
 Also, one may take into account the effect of restrictions imposed from a currency 
board (CB) arrangement in the SEE economies. Thus, in the empirical analysis, we 
incorporate a dummy variable to capture the existence of currency boards in these 
countries.15, 16 The existence of the currency board arrangement does not appear to 
have any effect on banks’ operating performance (see Model 6). This result comes as 
no surprise, as all countries in the region, except Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
are under managed ﬂoat exchange rate arrangements pegged to the euro over the
examined time period.
15. Bosnia-Herzagovina and Bulgaria are the only SEE countries that have a currency board ar-
rangement.
16. We are thankful to the anonymous referee for mentioning the potential signiﬁcance of the cur-
rency board in the comparison of operating performance in the SEE banking sectors.
C. STAIKOURAS, et al., South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics 2 (2007) 245-266260
3.2. Personnel expenses and physical capital expenses
As part of a sensitivity analysis we break operating performance down into its com-
ponents and proceed with the following regressions:
and:
where PE / A
 
and AE / A stand for the ratio of personnel expenses and administra-
tive expenses respectively to total assets, while the deﬁnition of all other variables
remains the same as previously described.
 Owing to data unavailability for these cost components, some banks from each 
country are excluded from the initial sample, while for Bosnia-Herzegovina all banks 
are excluded, since data for personnel expenses are not available at all. The new sam-
ple consists of 33 banks in 1998, 50 in 1999, 59 in 2000, 62 in 2001, 86 in 2002, and 
83 in 2003. 
 Table 5 presents some descriptive statistics for the new sample. The emerging 
characteristics for the SEE banking sectors are that administrative expenses consti-
tute the largest portion of total operating expenses, and that there has been an overall 
improvement in staff expenses and administrative expenses in all countries. Indeed, 
personnel expenses stand, on average, at 2.4 per cent of total assets, compared with 
3.3 per cent for the administrative costs. Interestingly, personnel expenses fall from 
2.8 per cent of total assets in 1998 to 2.2 per cent in 2003, while physical capital 
expenses remain relatively unchanged. This is mainly due to the developments in 
information technology applied to the SEE banking sectors. Information technology 
has been associated to date with higher expenses, as banks invest heavily in order 
to keep up with leading edge practices in data warehousing, risk management, and 
capital allocation, inter alia. The ﬁgures for personnel expenses are much higher than
those observed at the EU banking regime, where the average ratio of staff costs stands 
at 0.9 per cent of assets in 2003 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment [OECD], 2003). At the country level, the average bank in Albania presents 
the lowest ratio of personnel expenses to total assets among the SEE countries, while 
Romania stands at the other end. Moreover, Albania and Romania have the lowest 
and highest average administrative expenses ratio respectively.
(2)
(3)
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Operating Expenses’ Components (1998-2003)
 Note: OE/A: Operating Expenses / Total Assets; PE/A: Personnel Expenses / Total Assets;
AE/A: Administrative Expenses / Total Assets. Figures are means (expressed in percentages for 
all variables) for SEE countries over the period 1998-2003. Standard deviations are presented in 
parentheses. Further descriptive statistics can be provided upon request.
Tables 6 and 7 present the regression results, with personnel expenses and admini-
strative expenses as the dependent variable respectively. 
 Table 6 shows that the coefﬁcient of the loan loss reserves ratio is always positive
and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that dealing with a higher ratio of problem
loans invokes additional personnel expenses. The liquidity ratio is also positive and 
statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, consistent with the fact that liquid assets
require more labor costs to cover additional protection and transportation needs. The 
ratio of equity to total assets is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, as well as the ratio
of loans to total assets (at 10 per cent level of signiﬁcance), in line with the general
notion that originating, maintaining and monitoring loans involves substantial hu-
man resources. For the remaining variables, only the size and the age variables are 
statistically signiﬁcant, the former presenting a negative sign and the latter a posi-
tive one. The positive sign of the age variable suggests that ‘older’, mostly formerly 
state-owned, banks incur, on average, higher personnel expenses, probably because 
of overstafﬁng inherited from the old regime, necessitating further intensiﬁcation of
reform efforts in the direction of labor market liberalization. Finally, neither the bank 
deposits ratio nor any of the macroeconomic variables are signiﬁcant.
Country OE/A PE/A AE/A
Albania 2.697 0.984 1.713
(1.328) (0.394) (0.997)
Bulgaria 5.012 1.815 3.197
(1.535) (0.615) (1.054)
Croatia 4.396 2.058 2.339
(2.236) (0.971) (1.521)
FYR of Macedonia 6.141 2.069 4.072
(4.920) (0.755) (4.451)
Romania 8.291 3.469 4.822
(5.197) (2.044) (3.672)
Serbia & Montenegro 7.548 3.269 4.279
(5.195) (2.648) (2.552)
SEE 5.705 2.370 3.335
 (4.139) (1.528) (3.024)
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 Table 7 broadly reveals a similar picture. The loan loss reserves ratio is signiﬁ-
cantly positive, and this is also the case for the loans to total assets ratio. As expected, 
the ratio of cash and due from banks to total assets has a positive sign and is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, indicating that these assets require additional
transportation, storage and protection costs. Moreover, the size variable is signiﬁ-
cantly negative, as larger banks are able to manage their physical capital expenses 
more efﬁciently than smaller ones. A similar picture emerges when we use bank’s
market share instead of total assets to capture the market power of the ﬁrm. Contrary
to the results referring to personnel expenses, the coefﬁcients of the equity to assets
ratio and the age variable are positive but statistically insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁca-
tions. Finally, regarding the variables that control for differences in the market and 
macro environment among the SEE countries, these are all statistically insigniﬁcant
in all speciﬁcations. 
4. Conclusion
The restructuring process that started in the mid nineties in the SEE banking sector 
has intensiﬁed during the last ﬁve years. Substantial steps towards the rehabilitation
of state-owned banks, the write-offs of non-performing loans, and the enforcement of 
new prudential regulation and tighter supervision have taken place. In addition, the 
escalating competition arising from the entry of foreign banks has enhanced the focus 
on operating performance. These developments have brought the issue of operating 
performance in the SEE banking sector to the forefront.
 This paper seeks to contribute to the analysis of operating performance of the 
banking industry for the SEE region, an area rarely investigated, over the period 
1998-2003. To this end, we construct operating performance measures using account-
ing data. We ﬁnd that operating expenses have decreased in all SEE banking sectors
over the examined period, except for the FYR of Macedonia and Serbia & Montene-
gro, a clear sign that banks, on average, are improving their operating performance 
over time. Following a general-to-speciﬁc approach, we ﬁnd, however, that operat-
ing expenses, and their components, namely personnel expenses and administrative 
expenses, are still at very high levels compared with those of the banks’ European 
counterparts, reﬂecting the smaller size of the average bank, and the heavy burden of
staff.
 We further investigate the relationship between operating performance and various 
bank, market and macro speciﬁc characteristics. Operating performance is positively
related to loan quality and the asset size or the bank’s market share, and negatively 
related to liquidity, the loan ratio and the bank’s age. The negative relationship be-
tween operating performance and banks’ age suggests that ‘older’, and mostly newly 
privatized, state-owned banks have inherited signiﬁcant cost inefﬁciencies from the
old regime, and therefore, there is a need to intensify reform efforts to improve op-
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erating performance. Most market and macro variables seem to be insigniﬁcant, the
only exception being the EBRD index and the Herﬁndahl index, the latter only in
one speciﬁcation. Further analysis for the cost components conﬁrms these results
and shows that systematic differences in bank operating performance across the SEE 
countries exist. 
 Currently, it is widely believed that the proﬁtability of banks in the examined
countries is high, stemming mainly from the high intermediation spread. Looking 
forward, the large net interest margins are unlikely to last, as both competition among 
banks and economic consolidation efforts prior to the accession to the EU intensiﬁes.17 
As spreads decline, banks will need, among other measures, to address operating per-
formance. This paper identiﬁes as the main areas of cost cutting the rationalization 
of branch networks, the reduction of personnel expenses, and the application of strict 
cost control measures.
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